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BOOK REVIEW
COMMENTS ON HENRY J. RICHARDSON III,
THE ORIGINS OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2008)
D. A. Jeremy Telman
Valparaiso University School of Law
(forthcoming in 24/2South African Journal of Human Rights
(2009)
Professor Richardson’s work makes important contributions on
two fronts. It is a sophisticated work of both historical scholarship
and critical race theory. As historical scholarship, The Origins of
the African-American Interest in International law is a synthetic
work, drawing on diverse historical sources to recount a detailed
narrative of African-American claims to, interests in and appeals to
international law over approximately two centuries spanning, with
occasional peeks both forward and backward in time, from the
landing of the first African slaves at Jamestown in 1619 to the
1815 Treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812 between Britain and
the United States. Regarded as such, the book is richly rewarding.
Professor Richardson excavates historical source material for
evidence of the claims made by people of African heritage for
freedom, human dignity and self-determination. These claims
were variously expressed throughout the period of the Atlantic
slave trade and the enslavement of people of African heritage in
the Americas, often through conduct and other means might escape
a more traditional historian’s gaze. Richardson gives voice to
these claims as interests in international law, even if they were not
always conceived of as such by their authors and even if
international law – in the imperfect form in which it existed at the
time – did not recognize the justiciability of the claims.
Second, the book is a contribution to the tradition of critical
race theory.
It partakes of some of the narrative and
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methodological strategies of that tradition, including the fictive
reconstruction of historical events, with new African-American
voices added to the mix. But Professor Richardson is equally at
ease with the approach to international law of the New Haven
School, and he is thus able to write with great authority of how
African-American history can be understood to have comprised a
tradition of appeals to international law or international legal
norms as a source of remediation of the injustices that Africanheritage people suffered in the Americas
Viewed as a work of history, the book is not a typical product
of archival research. Professor Richardson does not and does not
claim to have undertaken original historical work. Rather, he has
read innumerable historical monographs, works of legal and
sociological theory, international law and critical race theory.
Armed with this store of knowledge, he is able to recast a
relatively familiar historical narrative –that of the Atlantic slave
trade and the African-American experience – through the lens of
international law.
It is a shame that the academic discipline of history does not
more highly prize such works of historical synthesis. One need not
always mine the archives to make historical discoveries. The most
important historical discoveries are often hidden in plain sight. So
it is with this book. There have been many histories written on the
African-American experience, but Professor Richardson’s focus on
the intersection of the history of the Atlantic slave trade with
various overlapping legal regimes within which that trade
developed permits us to view the history with fresh eyes.
And works of historical synthesis are not so easy to compose as
they might seem. The story must be well told and it must be told
from a novel perspective. This calls for two surprisingly distinct
sets of skills. The historian who can tell a good tale is rarely the
historian who can understand the broader ramifications of that tale
any more than the tenor who sings Puccini could have composed
the arias he sings. And alas, intellectual historians who plumb the
depths of consciousness in order to exhume our deepest thoughts,
aspirations, achievements and fiascos rarely do so without
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inflicting upon us so much erudition that we lose entirely the
ability to turn a page.
Telling the tale is especially challenging when it comes to the
history of marginalized groups, since traditional historical sources
rarely permit such groups to tell their stories in their own voices.
Rather, the narrative historian must recreate their stories from such
non-narrative sources as exist, such as birth, death, tax and census
records and from non-traditional sources, such as folk tales, songs,
fictionalized accounts and, as Professor Ricahrdson does with great
success in this book, conduct. In addition, legal documents are
often the historian’s best hope for reviving some sense of the
experienced of people who were not masters of their own destiny
and who, as a consequence, had not mastered writing.
And in this area, Professor Richardson’s methodology is most
impressive. He attempts to discern the intentions of AfricanAmericans through their conduct and articulates those intentions in
terms of legal claims and legal interests. He similarly extracts
evidence of those interests and claims from the records of cases in
which those interests and claims are not expressly made manifest.
I find this approach bold but convincing, at least in this case.
If I were to fault Professor Richardson’s approach to narrative,
it would only be for being a tad more prickly than I think is
warranted with respect to the methods necessary to give voice to
the historically marginalized. Such historical narratives are of
necessity more speculative than are similar narratives that can be
based on more traditional historical sources, such as first-hand,
eye-witness accounts, such as journals, autobiographies and the
like – or even contemporaneous secondary sources such as
journalistic accounts written from a perspective relatively
sympathetic to that of the historical subjects. Still, the difference is
really one of degree. I am fully convinced that Thucydides was the
author of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, but the fact that Thucydides
presented his own words as though they were uttered by the
Athenian leader does nothing to diminish my estimation of him as
a historian. Historical recreation is always an imaginative act.
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In any case, nowadays even biographers of the Founding
Fathers engage in novelistic recreations of 18th-century dialogue,
and Stephen Greenblatt and his fellow New Historicists pile
speculation upon speculation in order to develop theories of the
early modern imagination. In the light of such methodological
heterodoxy, it is hardly suspect if a historian of the AfricanAmerican experience engages in reasonable speculations regarding
the frames of mind of 17th and 18th century African-American
slaves. It may be that what I have called Professor Richardson’s
prickliness derives from the methodological conservatism of legal
historians, who inhabit a notorious backwater of the historical
profession, and from the gulf separating what passes for innovative
scholarship in that field and the tradition of creative historical
reconstruction pioneered by Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado and
others.
While I would not fault Professor Richardson’s historical
methodology, his invocation of international law can be a bit
confusing, if not misleading. The way Professor Richardson
speaks of international law in the 16th through the early 19th
century is in tension with the international lawyer’s comfortable
assumptions regarding that body of law primitive state in the early
modern era, but it is not Professor Richardson’s intention to call
those assumptions into question. Rather, what he means by an
“interest” in international law is something like an ideal-typical
reconstruction of what protections international law might offer –
or what rights it might convey – upon enslaved Africans.
But because it is so easy to confuse invocations of this interest
in international law both with the real international law (which was
not helpful to African-Americans) and with other, more robust
forms of what Professor Richardson calls “outside law,” I am left
wondering about the usefulness of Professor Richardson’s
terminology. What does it mean to say that people enslaved in the
Americas appealed to international law?
It clearly does not mean that they appealed to Grotius,
Pufendorf or Vattel or to other early formulations of international
law and pointed out to their captors that enslavement was
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inconsistent with principles recognized in treatises on international
law. They could not do so for two reasons. First, Professor
Richardson concedes that, for the most part, African slaves had no
familiarity with such texts. He also concedes that, with the
exception of the few occasions on which enslaved Africans made
their reliance on notions of international law explicit, the extent to
which African-Americans were even aware of the existence of a
sub-species of outside law called international law is a matter of
speculation. In any case, during the period covered by the book,
international law did not proscribe slavery and did not recognize
the various rights claimed by enslaved Africans. There were
always currents within international legal theory that recognized a
certain tension between principles of international law and the fact
of slavery, but those tensions persisted nonetheless.
There was no right to be free from capture, and there was a
very limited body of what we now call international human rights
and humanitarian law that constrained warring parties in their
treatment of captured persons. Nor were there international rules
or customs regulating the treatment of slaves, indentured servants
or employees for hire. As Professor Richardson’s work illustrates,
the status of Africans was very different under Dutch, English,
Spanish and Portuguese colonialism, but these differing practices
were a product of the laws of the differing empires and were not
subject to international regulation. Professor Richardson cannot
recount any case in which of any of those governments raised
objections to the treatment of slaves under the laws of one of the
others. They did not do so because they believed they had no right
or interest to do so under international law.
Which brings me to the more troublesome problem – and this
continues to be a problem for international law today – the subjects
of international law were states. Only states had rights and
obligations under international law that they could seek to enforce
through adjudicatory bodies, through diplomatic means, or through
resort to force. So, even if international law recognized the sorts of
legal claims identified by Professor Richardson, individual slaves,
even groups of slaves, had no standing to raise such claims. Early
modern international law recognized no right of self-determination
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and no right of rebellion. There simply was no legal person who
could press the claims of enslaved Africans or represent their
interests as a matter of international law. While Professor
Richardson contends that some independent African communities
in the Caribbean and South America achieved a status akin to
international personhood, he does not claim that such independent
communities arose in North America.
Things might be different if we lived in a monist world in
which all international legal norms are automatically incorporated
as domestic law as well. In the period covered by Professor
Richardson’s book, however, England was expressly dualist. As
Professor Richardson acknowledges, only Parliament had the
power to make domestic law, and international rules were binding
only to the extent they were enacted through parliamentary
legislation.
The Supremacy Clause gives the United States
Constitution’s more of a monist cast, but U.S. constitutional
history tilts more in the dualist direction, as Professor Richardson
also acknowledges. As a result, even if international law created
certain rights, it would not automatically provide a cause of action
or a remedy to African-Americans.
Things also might be different if international law were a subspecies of natural law, although even Grotian natural law permitted
slavery and refused to recognize a right of rebellion or escape. But
in the period covered in Professor Richardson’s book, international
law evolved from Grotius’s natural law foundations to Vattel’s
legal positivism, and there it has remained, for the most part, ever
since. Even in Grotius’s era, the natural law foundations of
international law were largely theoretical in nature. Law derived
from custom, and early modern practices provide a weak basis for
a claimed equivalence of international law and moral law. Both
the Roman and the Christian traditions managed to reconcile
notions of human dignity and higher law with the permissibility of
enslavement and the impermissibility of rebellion. So, while
Professor Richardson is able to provide ample evidence of appeals
to natural law, to the laws of other nations (including African
custom) and to the laws of England and its colonies, he has great
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difficulty identifying appeals to international law that are not better
understood as really falling into one of the other categories.
More generally, there is a tendency in the book to assume that
the natural law approach to international law holds out more
promise for African-Americans than does the positivist approach.
I have my doubts about that, although I could not dispute the
extensive evidence marshaled by Professor Richardson in support
of the view that the African-American interest in outside law often
appeals to some form of natural law. Still, natural law has rarely
been a progressive force. Natural law arguments helped to justify
white domination, male domination and heterosexism. And they
continue to do so. On the other hand, much that has been
accomplished through the international human rights movement in
the post-war era has been accomplished through a very simple
arrangement. Different cultures might not be able to agree on
ultimate truth, but if they can just agree that certain practices are
unlawful, then we can probably make some pretty good progress
towards international regulation of at least the most extreme forms
of inhumanity.
One’s enjoyment of the book does not turn, however, on a
satisfying rejoinder to these criticisms. I learned a great deal
reading it. Its general discussion of a Black tradition of appeal to
outside law is informative, convincing and above all helpful in
providing a conceptual matrix that aids in the understanding of
Black political practices. Professor Richardson states several times
in the book that the task will have to fall to some other scholar to
continue the narrative he has begun into the present. That is a
shame, as a second volume would be of extraordinary use. In his
introduction, Professor Richardson situates famous speeches of
Martin Luther King, Jr. and W.E.B. Dubois in the context of the
Black international tradition in a compelling way. This reader
would be very interested to read the narrative that connects
Professor Richardson’s account of that tradition up to 1812 with
these very important 20th-century African American perspectives
on international law and U.S. foreign relations.

